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Abstract: Argumentation is important for sharing knowledge and information. Given that the receiver of an
argument purportedly engages first and foremost with its content, one might expect trust to play a negligible
epistemic role, as opposed to its crucial role in testimony. I argue on the contrary that trust plays a fundamental role
in argumentative engagement. I present a realistic social epistemological account of argumentation inspired by
social exchange theory. Here, argumentation is a form of epistemic exchange. I illustrate my argument with two
real-life examples: vaccination hesitancy, and the undermining of the credibility of traditional sources of information
by authoritarian politicians.
Résumé: L'argumentation est im-portante pour le partage des connais-sances et des informations. Étant donné que le
destinataire d'un argu-ment s'engage prétendument d'abord et avant tout dans son contenu, on peut s'attendre à ce
que la confiance joue un rôle épistémique négligeable, par opposition à son rôle crucial dans un témoignage. Je
soutiens au con-traire que la confiance joue un rôle fondamental dans l'engagement argumentatif. Je présente une
descrip-tion épistémologique sociale réaliste de l'argumentation inspirée de la théorie des échanges sociaux. Ici,
l'argumentation est une forme d'é-change épistémique. J'illustre mon argumentation par deux exemples concrets:
l'hésitation à la vaccination et l'atteinte à la crédibilité des sources d'information traditionnelles par les politiciens
autoritaires.

1. Introduction
Argumentation, understood as the practice of “giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom, 1994),
seems to be an important mechanism for sharing knowledge and information. When being
presented with an argument, a knower can come to know something new—the conclusion—if
she believes the premises and recognizes the relation of epistemic support between premises and
conclusion. A paradigmatic case of transfer of knowledge by means of argumentation occurs in
mathematics, where mathematical proofs are quintessential instruments for sharing mathematical
knowledge (Easwaran, 2009) (Dutilh Novaes, 2021, Chapter 11). But the phenomenon is a more
general one, and indeed argumentation seems to play a pivotal epistemic role in a wide range of
domains such as science, politics, and law, among others.
Argumentation can be contrasted with testimony in that, through testimony, I may
acquire knowledge solely by aptly judging the testifier to be a reliable informant without
inspecting her own grounds for believing some proposition. With argumentation, however, my
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estimation of my informant’s reliability is not (purportedly at least) what grounds the transfer of
knowledge. Instead, it is my own endorsement of the premises and of the relation of epistemic
support between premises and conclusion that justifies my newly acquired belief in the
conclusion. Thus understood, one would expect trust to play a negligible epistemic role in
argumentation as opposed to testimony where it does play a crucial role.
However, one may wonder whether there really is such a difference between testimony
and argumentation with respect to trust; maybe trust is also a fundamental element in
argumentative processes (descriptively and/or normatively speaking). For example, what should
we say about the receiver of an argument who dismisses it outright, with no real engagement
with its content, simply because he does not trust the source? Is he breaking some epistemic
norm? Can this response be justified at all? In order to address these questions, a promising
avenue is to approach argumentation from the perspective of social epistemology.
Perhaps surprisingly, there has been relatively little attention paid to argumentation as a
topic of investigation in (analytic) social epistemology. The notable exception is A. Goldman,
who has written extensively on the topic (Goldman, 1994; 1997; 2004). However, while
foundational and groundbreaking, Goldman’s account of the social epistemology of
argumentation is in fact highly idealized, and not aimed at dealing with argumentation in
“messy” real-life scenarios. In particular, it is arguably not fully suitable to address the role of
trust in argumentation because, among other reasons, it seems to postulate that we readily engage
in argumentation with interlocutors who fundamentally disagree with us. But this is far from
certain, both descriptively and normatively. What we need instead is a more realistic social
epistemology of argumentation to investigate argumentation in real-life scenarios.
In this paper, I formulate such a theory inspired by the framework of social exchange
theory as developed by sociologists and social psychologists since the mid-20th century (Cook,
2013). The key idea is that argumentation can be seen as a form of epistemic exchange, and so
the findings from social exchange theory concerning exchanges in general should also be
relevant for a special kind of exchange, namely epistemic exchange, and in particular for
argumentation as one modality (among others) of epistemic exchange. Specifically, social
exchange theorists maintain that trust is a fundamental component of exchange relations in
general (both descriptively and normatively speaking). If this is true of exchanges in general, it
should also hold for argumentation as a kind of (epistemic) exchange. Thus, on the basis of a
conceptualization of argumentation as epistemic exchange, I argue that trust does indeed play a
more significant role in argumentation than is usually recognized in the literature: arguers will
tend to be wary of engaging in argumentation with interlocutors whom they do not trust
sufficiently. Importantly, I discuss both descriptive and normative aspects of these questions, but
the goal is ultimately to combine the two perspectives so as to arrive at a prescriptive account of
the social epistemology of argumentation.1
The paper proceeds as follows: I start by discussing the concept of epistemic vigilance
and locating testimony and argumentation within a range of different strategies for epistemic
vigilance. I then turn to argumentation specifically and argue that a Millian conception of
argumentation, according to which engaging with dissenters will naturally lead to epistemic
improvement, is descriptively inaccurate. In section 4, I briefly present social exchange theory,
A prescriptive account consists in “how we might help less rational people, who nevertheless aspire to rationality,
to do better” (Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky 1988, p. 9). While the concept of rationality may be contentious, the idea is
simply to help imperfect agents to “improve” (on some relevant metric) their behavior in a certain domain so that the
gap between the descriptive and the normative becomes smaller.
1
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and in section 5, I sketch a conception of argumentation as a form of epistemic exchange. I then,
in section 6, discuss whether argumentation can indeed compensate for diminished trust in
situations of epistemic exchange, as argued by some authors, and conclude that it cannot. I also
introduce a three-tiered model for argumentative engagement. In section 7, I discuss some
concrete examples where argumentation and trust (or the lack thereof) are closely related.
2. Epistemic vigilance, testimony, and argumentation
Humans are hyper-social animals. We need each other to survive as opposed to many animal
species that lead solitary lives. Moreover, our epistemic lives are also fundamentally social; most
of what we know, we learn from others (Harris, 2012). However, the social nature of our
epistemic lives entails vulnerability: information shared by others may not always be accurate, be
it because informants themselves are mistaken in their beliefs or because they deliberately
misinform us to their own benefit, so we must also have ways to assess the quality of the
information conveyed to us by others.
Inspired by these observations, Sperber and colleagues have introduced the useful
concept of epistemic vigilance:
Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to
the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this
risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive
mechanisms for epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al, 2010, p. 359).
Epistemic vigilance is an umbrella term that is meant to cover a wide range of different cognitive
mechanisms/strategies. These include, for example, ways of tracking and assessing people’s
trustworthiness as sources of information by means of reputational elements, the ability to infer
intentions in others, and coherence checks of the message content against the background of
prior beliefs. Sperber et al. believe that we are well equipped to perform these cognitive tasks,
thus being by and large competent when it comes to epistemic vigilance. For our purposes, one
distinction drawn by Sperber et al. is particularly significant:
[E]pistemic vigilance can be directed at the source of communicated information: Is the
communicator competent and honest? It can also be directed at the content of
communication, which may be more or less believable independently of its source
(Sperber, et al, 2010, p. 375, emphasis added).
Consider now two quintessential ways in which information and knowledge can be shared:
testimony and argumentation. Prima facie it may seem that, in cases of testimony, epistemic
vigilance is directed mostly at the source of information, whereas in argumentation there is
primarily engagement with the content communicated. This is indeed a plausible view, and one
that aligns with much of what has been said about testimony and argumentation in the social
epistemology literature.
Testimony occurs when someone tells something to another person, thus giving the
second person the option of believing what she says. Whether testimony in general can be
considered a legitimate source of knowledge is in fact an old philosophical question, which has
attracted the interest of classical Indian philosophers (Chakrabarti & Matilal, 1994) as well as
early modern philosophers such as Locke (Boespflug, 2019). Testimony has been extensively
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discussed in the epistemological literature in recent decades (Lackey & Sosa 2006) (Goldman &
Blanchard, 2015). In this literature, there are different accounts of the epistemology of testimony,
but most of them agree that trust is a key component in testimony (Dormandy, 2020). Indeed, a
successful instance of testimony will typically be the result of the receiver judging the testifier to
be sufficiently trustworthy so as to take their word at face value; epistemic vigilance is directed
primarily at the source of information (though the receiver may also perform some sort of
coherence check on the content of the message).
But, as discussed in the literature on the norms of assertion, when witnessing someone
engaging in an act of assertion, we typically take the asserter to have good (epistemic) reasons to
make the assertion either because she knows its content to be true or because she has good
reasons to think she is justified in that belief (Lackey J., 2007). Furthermore, in some cases,
rather than simply assuming that the testifier must have good enough reasons to assert that P, we
may also want to inspect those grounds ourselves, and thus we may ask for further support for
the assertion. Indeed, as claimed by Brandom (1994) and taken up by a number of different
authors, when someone makes an assertion that P he also thereby undertakes the obligation to
justify that P upon request by others. That is, if challenged, the asserter must provide reasons for
her assertion in what Brandom calls the “game of giving and asking for reasons.” But whenever
such a challenge is posed, that is, when further reasons are requested, we leave the domain of
pure testimony and enter the domain of argumentation.
Crucially, when requesting reasons supporting an assertion that P, the receiver is no
longer only directing epistemic vigilance towards the source as in the case of pure testimony.
Instead, she is also engaging with the content of the claim. So it seems that, in this respect,
testimony and argumentation can be seen as rather different mechanisms for epistemic vigilance:
one is primarily source-oriented, while the other is primarily content-oriented. The question
however is whether, in argumentation, epistemic vigilance towards the content will occur even in
the absence of sufficient trust in the source. This is the main question to be addressed in this
paper.
3. A Millian conception of argumentation
It is commonly thought that to engage in argumentation can be a way to acquire more accurate
beliefs. By critically examining reasons for and against a given position, we would be able to
weed out weaker, poorly justified beliefs (more likely to be false) and end up with stronger,
suitably justified beliefs (more likely to be true). This is indeed a very widespread view, perhaps
even the most widely held view on argumentation among philosophers. On this view,
argumentation is typically considered to be truth-conducive, at least in cases where there is an
objectively correct answer to a problem. Goldman captures the gist of it in the following terms:
Norms of good argumentation are substantially dedicated to the promotion of truthful
speech and the exposure of falsehood, whether intentional or unintentional. […] Norms
of good argumentation are part of a practice to encourage the exchange of truths through
sincere, non-negligent, and mutually corrective speech. (Goldman, 1994, p. 30).
In this vein, a number of thinkers, most notably John Stuart Mill (and more recently [Betz 2013]
and [Mercier & Sperber 2017]), maintain that interpersonal argumentative situations involving
people who truly disagree with each other work best to realize the epistemic potential of
4

argumentation to improve our beliefs. 2 Mill famously defended this position in On Liberty
(1859) saying that when our ideas are challenged by engagement with those who disagree with
us, we are forced to consider our own beliefs more thoroughly and critically.
[Man] is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience
alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions
and practices gradually yield to fact and argument; but facts and arguments, to produce any
effect on the mind, must be brought before it. (Mill, 1999, p. 41).
He describes this process as a free exchange of ideas. The expected result is that the
remaining beliefs, those that have survived critical challenges, will be better grounded than those
held before such encounters. As Mill puts it, “both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post,
as soon as there is no enemy in the field”3 (Mill, 1999, p. 83).
Dissenters thus force us to stay epistemically alert instead of becoming too comfortable
with existing, entrenched beliefs. But for this process to be successful, dissenters must be
permitted to voice their opinions and criticism freely, and indeed Mill’s forceful defense of free
speech is one of his most celebrated positions. He emphasizes the role played by the free
exchange of ideas in facilitating the growth of knowledge in a society: the more dissenting views
and arguments in favor or against each of them are exchanged, the more likely it is that the
“good” ones will prevail (Halliday & McCabe 2019).
But it is not sufficient that dissenters be given the opportunity to voice their opinions
freely. It is also of crucial importance that receivers of these opinions and arguments be willing
to engage with dissenters in good faith and with an open mind.4 Mill pays much attention to the
structural conditions for the free exchange of ideas but seems to fail to consider the welldocumented tendency to avoid engaging with dissenting views altogether and to explain away
contrary evidence so as to preserve prior beliefs.
Indeed, there is quite some evidence suggesting that arguments are in fact not a very
efficient means to change minds in most real-life situations (Kolbert, 2017) (Gordon-Smith,
2019). People typically do not like to change their minds about firmly entrenched beliefs they
hold, so when they are confronted with arguments or evidence that contradict these beliefs, they
tend to either look away or to discredit the source of the argument as unreliable—a phenomenon
known as “confirmation bias” (Nickerson, 1998). In particular, arguments that threaten our core
beliefs and our sense of belonging to a group (e.g., political beliefs) typically trigger various
forms of motivated reasoning whereby one outright rejects those arguments without engaging
substantially with their content (Taber & Lodge 2006) (Kahan, 2017). Engaging in
argumentation is often a means to express and cement social identities rather than to come closer
to the truth (Talisse, 2019).
Relatedly, when choosing among a vast supply of options, people tend to gravitate
towards content and sources that confirm their existing opinions in so-called “echo chambers”
and “epistemic bubbles” (Nguyen, 2020). These conversations with like-minded people may then
2

I have defended this view myself (Dutilh Novaes, 2021), but with the important caveat that the beneficial epistemic
effect of interpersonal argumentation will come about only against the background of specific circumstances that
ensure open-mindedness and good faith exchange of ideas. Moreover, the topic under discussion matters. For
intellective problems, that is those that have a unique answer within a given theoretical framework (e.g., a
mathematical or logical problem), group discussion has a clear beneficial, truth-conducive effect, but that is much
less the case for so-called judgmental problems (Laughlin, 2011).
3
Notice here an instance of the familiar “argument-as-war” conception of argumentation (Cohen, 1995).
4
There is also the question of whether dissenting voices will be paid attention to at all if they belong to marginalized
groups. I return to this question briefly below.
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reinforce their prior beliefs and even drive them to more extreme versions of those beliefs. In
other words, the mere availability of dissenting voices is clearly not sufficient to ensure that
knowers remain epistemically alert and consider all sides of a question, as suggested by Mill;
there is always the possibility of simply not engaging constructively with these voices and the
substance of their arguments in the spirit of a “free exchange of ideas” (or simply not engaging at
all!). Moreover, the familiar phenomenon of polarization often arises: instead of bringing parties
closer together, argumentation and deliberation often have the opposite effect of drawing them
further apart (Sunstein, 2017).
These observations suggest that we are not Millians when it comes to argumentation and dissent.
The epistemic alertness that Mill believed would be the natural result of being exposed to
dissenting opinions and arguments often fails to come about. The Millian account is thus
descriptively inaccurate, at least with respect to many contexts (it might apply to some extent to
some specialized contexts such as in science). One might retort that the Millian account is still
normatively correct, but given the fact that it is arguably highly idealized, it is not suitable to
offer prescriptive recommendations for fallible human agents. Instead, we need a more realistic
approach to the (social) epistemology of argumentation, which will be sketched in the next
sections.
4. Social exchange theory
In order to formulate a realistic account of argumentation as epistemic exchange, I draw
inspiration from social exchange theory (SET). This is a framework developed by sociologists
and social psychologists that seeks to explain human social behavior by means of processes of
exchange between parties involving costs and rewards against the background of social networks
and power structures (Cook, 2013). SET is an influential and empirically robust framework that
has been used to investigate a wide range of social phenomena. The framework was originally
developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s under the influence of work in economics (rational
choice theory) and psychology (behaviorism), but it was also inspired by earlier anthropological
work by Malinowski, Mauss, and Lévi-Strauss (Cook, 2013). A key idea is that while humans
have to protect their own interests to thrive, they are also highly dependent on others and on
social structures more generally, which gives rise to an interplay between self-interest and
interdependence. SET relies on concepts such as subjective cost-benefit analysis and comparison
between alternatives while also emphasizing the importance of trust, reciprocity, and fairness
(Stafford, 2008).
In the words of sociologist Peter Blau, one of the pioneers in the field, “social exchange
... refers to voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by the returns they are expected to
bring and typically do in fact bring from others” (Blau, 1964, p. 91). Social exchange is
contrasted with formalized economic exchange where the exact terms of the exchange are made
explicit beforehand. By contrast, social exchange “involves the principle that one person does
another a favor, and while there is a general expectation of some future return, its exact nature is
definitely not stipulated in advance” (Blau 1986, p. 93). Successful social exchanges can be
mutually beneficial when both parties are better off by exchanging with each other rather than
abstaining from it.
The concept of resource is a key component of SET as resources are what is exchanged
in these interactions (Törnblom & Kazemi 2012). The concept is understood at a fairly high level
of abstraction, which allows for different kinds of interactions to be conceptualized within the
same model. For example, economic transactions, romantic relationships, workspace dynamics
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etc. can all be conceptualized as instances of social exchanges, but involving different kinds of
resources. There are different taxonomies of resources available in the literature, but an
influential taxonomy classifies resources as belonging to one of six categories: goods, status,
affection, services, information, and money (Foa & Foa 1980). Importantly, exchanges may
involve resources of different kinds, for example when a service is provided in exchange for
money.
Another key notion is that of an exchange network or opportunity structure defined as a
set of possible or potential relations that limit and constrain who may exchange and interact with
whom (Cook, 2013). Typically, an agent will have a range of potential exchange partners to
obtain a given resource that she deems valuable; she will then opt among these different options
for the one that seems “best” (or least bad, when none of the options is truly advantageous)
relative to a number of parameters (not only maximizing individual payoff, but also maintaining
valuable social ties etc.). In other words, decisions to engage with a particular exchange partner
are contrastive decisions: I choose to engage with A instead of engaging with B or C, with whom
I could also have exchanged given the relevant opportunity structure. “[I]individuals form and
maintain a relationship as long as the benefits from that relationship exceed those available
elsewhere” (Lawler, Thye, & Yoon, 2008, p. 521).
Moreover, social exchanges can be viewed as belonging to different categories. Four
main types of social exchanges are described in the literature (Molm, Collett, & Schaefer, 2007)
(Lawler, Thye, & Yoon, 2008, see figure 1):
•
•
•
•

Negotiated exchange: actors jointly negotiate the terms of an agreement that benefits both
parties either equally or unequally. Both sides of the exchange are agreed upon at the
same time.
Reciprocal exchange: actors perform individual acts that benefit another, such as giving
assistance or advice, without negotiation and without knowing whether or when or to
what extent the other will reciprocate. It is rather like a process of “gift-exchange.”
Generalized exchange: the recipient of benefit does not return benefit directly to the
giver, but to another actor in the social circle. The giver eventually receives some benefit
in return, but from a different actor.
Productive exchange: interactions aimed at a jointly produced collective good wherein
people unilaterally provide benefits to the group and receive benefit from it.
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Figure 1: Four forms of social exchange (from (Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008)). The arrows
indicate the flow of benefits from one agent to another.
Naturally, in all four forms of social exchange, but especially in reciprocal, generalized, and
productive exchanges, a great deal of trust must be involved. Entering a social exchange is
typically a trusting action, based on the expectation, but not the assurance, that the exchange
partner will reciprocate at some point. Moreover, the resouces/benefits being offered must also
be such that they are truly (rather than merely apparently) valuable for the receiver. The
perspective adopted is diachronic, that is, of repeated exchanges, and the prediction is that, in the
medium-long run, people will stop exchanging with given partners if these partners are
repeatedly not “pulling their weight” as it were. “The failure of reciprocity results in infrequent
exchange” (Cook, 2013, p. 66). Thus, estimating the trustworthiness of different potential
exchange partners is a fundamental component of choosing whom to exchange with; prior
experiences with particular actors as well as reputational factors will be involved in these
assessments.
This means that interpersonal trust is both an initial condition as well as a result of
successful exchanges: actors will typically choose to exchange with partners that they consider
more trustworthy than the alternatives both in the sense that they offer valuable resources and in
the sense that they will suitably reciprocate in the long run. Iterated successful exchanges will in
turn increase trust in those partners, as well as positive affect towards them and towards the
relationship as such (Lawler, Thye, & Yoon 2008).
Another well-established result in the SET literature is the correlation between
uncertainty and commitment. Commitment refers to the extent to which an actor engages in
repeated exchanges with the same partner over time. Uncertainty in turn refers to the probability
of suffering from acts of opportunism imposed by one’s exchange partners. “If an actor or subset
of actors within a given opportunity structure prove themselves to be trustworthy, continued
exchanges with that exchange partner provides a safe haven from other potentially opportunistic
partners” (Cook, 2013, p. 70).
Commitment thus understood seems like a laudable and reasonable principle, and indeed
it is an essential factor for social cohesion. However, commitment also comes at a price: “such
8

commitments, however, have the drawback of incurring sizable opportunity costs in the form of
exchange opportunities foregone in favor of the relative safety provided by ongoing
commitments” (Cook, 2013, p. 70). In other words, if I continue to exchange with partner A
because so far these exchanges have been largely successful from my perspective, this may
preclude me from considering other options within the relevant opportunity structure. It may well
be that exchanging with potential partner B instead would be even more advantageous, but by
sticking to A exclusively, I forego this opportunity.
Unsurprisingly, a result observed both in lab experiments and in real-life scenarios is that
actors have a greater tendency to form commitments in environments with high levels of
uncertainty. These are environments where generalized trust towards potential partners is low on
account of widespread occurrences of opportunism and a high frequency of actors acting in bad
faith. In these scenarios, “actors were willing to forgo more profitable exchanges with untested
partners in favor of continuing to transact with known partners who had demonstrated their
trustworthiness in previous transactions” (Cook, 2013, p. 71). Again, the rationale for
commitment thus understood in situations of uncertainty is perfectly reasonable in terms of the
risk assessment necessary to choose among different exchange partners.
In this section, I’ve presented a very concise selection of concepts from social exchange
theory, which will be relevant later on for the discussion of argumentation as epistemic
exchange. The key points are:
• Engaging in an exchange is a voluntary action that consists of a choice to exchange with
a given partner rather than with other potential partners based on the estimation that
engaging with this particular partner will be more advantageous (or at least less
disadvantageous) and/or less risky than engaging with any of the alternatives.
• What is exchanged in these interactions are different kinds of resources.
• Most of these exchanges will involve a certain amount of trust, as social exchange is
generally speaking more like “gift-giving” and less like an economic transaction: there is
expectation but no guarantee of reciprocity.
• In environments of (real or perceived) high uncertainty, actors will tend to continue to
exchange with known partners, even if this will entail opportunity costs.
5. Argumentation as epistemic exchange
Now that some of the basics of SET have been laid out, let us further unpack the idea of
argumentation as a form of epistemic exchange. Recall that Mill describes engaging with
dissenters as a “free exchange of ideas.” My claim here is that the reference to “exchange” is not
purely metaphorical. Indeed, we can view social processes of circulation of knowledge,
information, justification etc. as a particular kind of exchange, which we may describe as
epistemic exchange. These exchanges will chiefly involve resources of a particular kind, which
we may call epistemic resources: resources that are primarily involved in processes of
production and circulation of knowledge.5 Moreover, resources such as attention and time will
also be crucial for such processes. It may also happen that epistemic resources are exchanged for
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We do not want to count, for example, solar light as an epistemic resource, even if it is also essential for the
production and circulation of knowledge insofar it is essential for human life in general. But solar light is not
primarily involved in these processes. Admittedly, the concept of epistemic resource requires a much more detailed
discussion than what I offer here. This concept is one of the topics of investigation that my research team is
currently working on.
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non-epistemic resources in a given interaction, for example a tutor who is paid to teach a pupil,
but we may still view such exchanges as epistemic.
Thus understood, epistemic exchanges will be of various kinds. Argumentation is one
specific type of epistemic exchange among others, including testimony. In argumentation,
epistemic resources such as knowledge, evidence, justification, critical objections, defeaters can
be exchanged by means of arguments. Thus, these resources will not only be of the kind that may
expand one’s set of beliefs, such as knowledge or justification, but also of the kind that may
decrease one’s set of beliefs, such as objections or defeaters.
Crucially, an argumentative exchange thus understood can be mutually beneficial;
argumentation need not be a zero-sum game with winners and losers. True enough, the
“argument as war” conception is widespread (as well as much criticized (Cohen, 1995)), and
there’s no denying that, at least in some circumstances, people argue to win and to beat their
“opponents” (Fisher & Keil, 2016). But arguing to win is just one of the possible aims that
arguers may have (Dutilh Novaes, 2020). In contrast, when engaging in argumentation in the
spirit of epistemic exchange, ideally both parties will come out as “winners” in the sense that
they will have both benefited from the exchange. Simply put, they will both have learned
something of value. Indeed, when the arguer offers the addressee some epistemic grounds
supporting a given conclusion, she may be offering some valuable epistemic resources in the
form of evidence, justification etc. that the addressee may benefit from. In turn, if the addressee
suitably challenges the arguer’s claims with appropriate objections, requests for further
clarifications, or defeaters, this may lead to epistemic improvement for the arguer too in that she
may be able to revise her initial beliefs (as indeed claimed by Mill).
Importantly, argumentation may also lead to the joint production of new epistemic
resources. Recall that one of the four forms of social exchange discussed in the previous section
is productive exchange: interactions aimed at a jointly produced collective good. A paradigmatic
example would be the social epistemology of mathematical proofs. As described by Lakatos
(1976), in terms of a dialectic of proofs and refutations, mathematical proofs are typically a joint
effort involving those proposing a proof and those inspecting the proof for possible mistakes and
counterexamples, or simply for steps in the proof that are not sufficiently clear. These “critics”
may be colleagues, or students, or, more formally, the referees who are asked to peer-review
papers for journals (Andersen, 2018) (Dutilh Novaes, 2021). This critical engagement is an
integral part of the process of formulating new proofs, so much so that the “voice” of the
critics/referees is typically still subtly present in the end-result of the proof. And while the case
for productive exchange through argumentation may be the clearest in mathematics, it is
arguably also present in other (scientific) domains, especially given the role of the peer review
system. The protocol of “adversarial collaboration” in the social sciences (Mellers, Hertwig, &
Kahneman, 2001) would be a particularly clear example of productive exchange through
argumentation.
6. Can argumentation compensate for the absence of sufficient trust?
Let us now return to the concept of epistemic vigilance and to the point that argumentation may
allow for the transmission of content even when there is diminished trust between the parties.
After all, this would (presumably) be what differentiates argumentation from testimony. “The
exchange of arguments improves communication by allowing messages to be transmitted even in
the absence of sufficient trust” (Mercier, 2016, p. 690). The thought is that, with successful
testimony, the content of a message is accepted without reservation because the receiver trusts
10

the sender; no further reasons are required. (Though the receiver may run a coherence check on
her prior beliefs.) In the absence of trust, the receiver will require additional reasons to be
convinced, for example, by engaging with the content of the message critically and requesting
additional support for the claim. This is precisely when the “game of giving and asking for
reasons” that constitutes argumentation will kick in.
However, if argumentation is indeed suitably conceived as a form of exchange, and if
social exchange theorists are correct in claiming that evaluations of trustworthiness play an
important role in deciding whom to engage with in exchanges, then the prediction will be that
argumentation will not necessarily facilitate the transmission of messages in the absence of
sufficient trust. To enter an argumentative situation in the spirit of honest epistemic exchange
(especially when there is disagreement), a person must think that the reasons offered by other
parties are minimally reliable. For example, if she suspects that someone presenting arguments is
in fact deliberately trying to mislead her, she may reasonably assume that the arguments being
offered are epistemically defective, as in the case of a dishonest seller trying to sell a
malfunctioning car.
The role of trust in argumentation and epistemic exchanges more generally becomes even
more palpable if one considers the key idea from SET that exchanges occur against the
background of opportunity structures, where actors typically have the choice among different
possible exchange partners. Naturally, they will tend to choose those who they deem to be more
trustworthy than others (though this is just one of the factors influencing such choices, albeit a
crucial one). The same holds for epistemic exchanges: given limitations of time and attention, it
makes sense to focus on those partners who the actor has reason to believe have valuable
epistemic resources to offer6 and are not acting in bad faith. For this to be the case, these partners
must not only be sufficiently competent/knowledgeable on the topic in question, but they must
also not be acting dishonestly or opportunistically.
Thus, in this respect, the conceptualization of argumentation as epistemic exchange being
articulated here differs substantially from the Sperber/Mercier epistemic vigilance model in that
it postulates that a certain amount of trust is typically (though perhaps not always) required for
an argumentative exchange to be epistemically fruitful. This means that, contrary to what
Mercier claims, argumentation will often not be a solution to the problem of communication in
the absence of sufficient trust.
Another line of argument supporting the hypothesis that trust plays a significant role in
argumentation comes from K. Hawley’s work on trust and trustworthiness, in particular as
pertaining to assertions (Hawley, 2014; 2019, Chapter 3). She writes:
Trusting someone to do something involves both trust in her competence and trust in her
willingness to act; part of trustworthiness is the attempt to avoid commitments you are
not competent to fulfill. The special case of trusting what someone says involves both
trusting her to possess the truth (or knowledge), and trusting her to speak sincerely.
People can betray our trust through either error or deceit, and part of trustworthiness is
the attempt to avoid making assertions where you lack knowledge… (Hawley, 2014, p.
17).
6

Naturally, this may give rise to occurrences of epistemic injustice, as the estimation of how valuable a potential
partner is for epistemic exchange may be influenced by epistemically irrelevant factors such as gender or race (more
on epistemic injustice shortly).
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So far no surprises here, as the significance of trust and trustworthiness in the context of
testimony/assertion has already been recognized. But do these observations on assertion carry
over to argumentation? In fact, it is plausible to view an argument as a special kind of assertion,
or as a structured collection of assertions. For example, in a categorical argument of the form ‘A,
therefore B,’ three assertions seem to be made: A, B, and that there is a relevant relation of
support between A and B (by contrast, in a hypothetical argument of the form ‘suppose A, then
B would be the case,’ the only assertion made is that there is a relevant relation of support
between A and B). A precursor of this view is Frege’s observation that an inference is “the
pronouncement of a judgement made in accordance with logical laws on the basis of previously
passed judgments” (Frege, 1984, p. 318) For Frege, inference is itself a judgment, which takes
judgments (premises) to judgment (conclusion). (Frege’s inferences would correspond to
arguments, and Frege’s judgments to assertions in the present framework.)
What is the epistemic status of arguments relative to the epistemic status of assertions for
receivers? One might think that arguments should be epistemically more transparent than
assertions, as the receiver can inspect the relation of support between premises and conclusion
herself. But just as with factual assertions of the kind “Miss Scarlet killed the butler,” where the
receiver is often not in a position to ascertain its truth herself and must thus rely on the testimony
of an informant, the receiver of an argument is often not in a position to assess the cogency of the
relation of support between premises and conclusion. This may be the case in virtue of domainspecific knowledge that is required to evaluate the argument, but also simply because, contrary to
what many of us would prefer to believe, correctly evaluating the cogency of arguments is in fact
a rather difficult task.7 As widely documented by research into reasoning biases, reasoners are
often led astray in their evaluations of arguments due to the influence of a number of prima facie
irrelevant factors (Stanovich, 2003). The very fact that, for millennia, argumentation theorists
and logicians have spent considerable time and energy identifying and discussing fallacies is
another indication of how easy it is to be “fooled” by arguments that appear correct but are not.
If receivers of arguments have some level of meta-cognitive awareness of their own limitations
and vulnerability to misleading arguments (which is, admittedly, an empirical question), then one
should expect that trustworthiness will be a concern for the receiver of arguments just as it is for
the receiver of assertions: she wants to maximize the likelihood that the epistemic resources
being offered are indeed of good quality.
I have presented two arguments supporting the claim that trust and the trustworthiness of
the source are significant factors for receivers of arguments when evaluating their correctness.
One is based on the idea that argumentation is a form of epistemic exchange and that all
exchanges involve evaluations of trustworthiness; and the second one is based on an epistemic
similarity between assertions and arguments, namely that receivers are not always in a good
position to evaluate their truth/correctness.8 From an exchange perspective, there are two senses
in which trust is relevant: for the giver, the question is whether the receiver will reciprocate in
due course; for the receiver, the question is whether the resources being offered by the giver are
‘of good quality’ and will indeed be valuable and beneficial for the receiver. 9 The present
7

But note that, in a recent book, Mercier (2020) argues that we are in fact well equipped to ascertain what and
whom to believe. By contrast, other researchers argued vehemently that we are easily “duped” (Levine, 2019).
8
Yap (2013) has pointed out other ways in which credibility plays a role in argumentation similar to its role in
testimony.
9
Of course, trust is a multifaceted phenomenon, which manifests itself in many ways. Here I have focused on
interpersonal trust, and in particular on these two manifestations: expectations of reciprocity, and expectations
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discussion has focused on the receiver’s side, 10 and the question for the receiver is primarily
whether the argument being offered is of good quality. Hawley’s account of trusting someone
who is asserting suggests two ways in which an an arguer may betray the trust of an addressee by
offering a low quality argument. This may happen if the arguer is simply not sufficiently
knowledgeable on the topic at hand and thus makes a mistake; or if the arguer is deliberately
trying to deceive the receiver, for example by presenting an argument to “trick” her into doing
something that is not in her best interest.
Moreover, not only can argumentation not “fix” communication in the absence of
sufficient trust: argumentation may even erode trust, i.e., lead to a decrease in trust between the
communicating parties. Two relevant pieces of evidence can be offered for this claim. Firstly, in
the literature on peer disagreement, it has been noted that, if a presumed peer holds a view that
appears to be simply preposterous from the perspective of a given agent, a rational response by
this agent is to downgrade the other person from her status as a peer (Worsnip, 2014). 11
Secondly, work on Bayesian simulations of group deliberation shows that, when agents initially
trust each other but hold different views, if they engage in argumentation/deliberation they in
fact come to trust each other less than before (Olsson, 2013). The conclusion is thus that erosion
of trust is one of the risks/potential losses that may be incurred as a result of engaging in
argumentation, which thus must enter the “cost-benefit analysis” on whether to argue or not
(Paglieri & Castelfranchi 2010).
To be clear, the claim is not that trust is a necessary condition for argumentation to come
about. In many circumstances (e.g. political debates), one will have good reasons to engage in
argumentation with someone one does not trust (in some relevant sense of “trust”). The claim is
rather that, when argumentation is meant to be a form of epistemic exchange from which one
hopes to learn something of value, trust and trustworthiness do play a role, and an arguer will
typically choose to engage with a partner that she considers to be more trustworthy than the
alternatives (though perhaps not always, as trust is one among a number of factors to be taken
into account). This is the case both descriptively and prescriptively speaking, given cognitive
limitations of the arguer and the likelihood of opportunistic behavior in exchange partners.
These observations lead to the formulation of a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange
and argumentative engagement, which draws substantially from social exchange theory.
1. Attention/exposure. The first stage of argumentative engagement consists in establishing
whether two people are potential exchange partners at all, given the relevant opportunity
structure for epistemic engagement. In simpler terms: who is in an agent’s network of
potential contacts? Who is in a position to attract someone’s attention? It may be that
potential lines of communication are cut, say in the case of structural censorship of some
messages/senders or echo chambers (Nguyen 2020). At the other end of the spectrum, it
may be that so many signals are being broadcast that the many different sources are all

regarding the quality and value of the resources being offered (e.g., whether a seller is not offering a malfunctioning
car under the guise of a well-functioning one).
10
For the giver/arguer, one important question is whether a potential receiver is likely to truly listen and pay
attention to the argument. If not, then it would be a waste of time to engage in argumentation with an unresponsive
addressee.
11
To be fair, this is a much disputed issue in the peer disagreement literature, and many authors claim that the
“conciliatory” response, whereby one moves closer to the dissenting view of the peer, is the more rational response.
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competing for the receiver’s attention, in a so-called “attention economy” (Franck
2019).12
2. Choosing whom to engage with. The next stage involves making choices against the
background of possibilities for exchange as determined by the relevant opportunity
structure. Typically, there will be a number of options, and given limitations of time and
attention, choices will have to be made also in the context of epistemic exchanges (even
if it is reasonable to expect that one will engage with a wider range of partners for
epistemic exchanges than when one buys a car, for example). Among those who have
caught my initial attention, whom do I further engage with? It is at this point that
considerations of trustworthiness come into play (among other factors). In particular,
choosing to trust someone will sometimes entail choosing not to trust someone else,
especially when their respective messages conflict.
3. Engagement with content. It is only at a third stage that engagement with the content of
the argument properly speaking should occur. This is when the actual epistemic exchange
in fact takes place. At this point the receiver will reflectively (and perhaps critically)
engage with the argument seeking to understand its substance and evaluate its cogency.
In case of a positive evaluation, this may lead to a change in view for the receiver. It may
also lead to a mutually beneficial exchange where both arguer and addressee improve
their respective epistemic stances and in some cases even go on to create new epistemic
resources together (productive exchange).
One of the advantages of this model is that it offers resources to account for various forms of
epistemic injustice. Regarding the first stage, it highlights a familiar problem for marginalized
groups who are pushed towards the fringes of exchange networks. Effectively, they are not part
of the “conversation,” as it were. What good is it to be voicing arguments against oppression, if
no one who might be able to do something about it is actually paying attention? Regarding the
second stage, comparative judgments of trustworthiness may give rise to forms of epistemic
injustice if they are motivated by epistemically irrelevant factors such as gender or race (Medina,
2011). Finally, in the third stage forms of argumentative injustice may arise if the social identity
of the arguer influences judgments of the cogency of the argument by receivers (Bondy, 2010);
the bar for persuasion may be set higher for arguers that are viewed as prima facie less
competent in virtue of gender or race etc.
Note that this three-tiered model contrasts with models where epistemic evaluating of the
source and the content of a message happen in parallel, and/or with significant feedback loop
between the two (which I take to be the gist of the Mercier-Sperber epistemic vigilance model).
In the next section, I briefly discuss two case studies that seem to be instances of the three-tiered
model rather than of alternative models.
7. Some examples
So let us now discuss some concrete examples of argumentation in real-life situations so as to
gauge the soundness of the three-tiered model described above and the hypothesis concerning the
role of trust in argumentation. The two examples to be discussed are vaccination hesitancy and
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See (Dutilh Novaes & de Ridder forthcoming.) for a discussion of scarcity vs. overabundance of information in an
epistemic environment.
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authoritarian politicians who artificially create a perception of uncertainty towards traditional
sources of information such as journalism and science.
Vaccination hesitancy was considered to be one of the top ten threats to global health by
the World Health Organization in 2019. 13 As is well known, it is a tendency that has been
intensified in the last decades, in particular as a result of an infamous and now retracted paper
claiming that there is a connection between vaccination and the onset of autism. The puzzling
thing is, even now that this claim has been thoroughly debunked, vaccination hesitancy remains
strong, which seems to suggest that purely scientific arguments are not sufficient to dispel the
persistent perception of a high likelihood of negative outcomes as a result of vaccinating
children. Indeed, it has been shown that these so-called “vaccination myths” are not easily
debunked with scientific arguments (Horne, Powell, Hummel, & Holyoak 2015). Even more
disheartening: other fact-based communication strategies and interventions do not seem to fare
much better either (Nyhan, Reifler, Richey, & Freed 2014).
What could explain the obstacles to changing hesitant minds on the safety of vaccination
with scientific arguments? A plausible explanation is the high prevalence of mistrust towards
science in general and the pharmaceutical industry in particular. And the truth is, this mistrust is
oftentimes not entirely unwarranted. A 2019 editorial in The Lancet Infectious Diseases entitled
“Trust Issues” addressed precisely this problem:
In the USA, the country is plagued by prescription opioid misuse fuelled by aggressive
pharmaceutical marketing, the people of Flint, MI, have been without safe drinking water for 3
years, and the most basic drugs are often unaffordable because of profit-driven health care. Little
wonder that some individuals question the authorities' desire to prioritise their wellbeing. It is
impossible to build trust while at the same time abusing it.14
While mistrust in “Big Pharma” may be more pronounced in the USA than in other countries,
this is a general problem that affects vaccination compliance elsewhere too. In fact, a 2018
systematic review of the literature on vaccination and trust (Larson, et al., 2018) found that,
while more research is needed to understand trust as it relates to vaccination acceptance, it seems
that people are more likely to get vaccinated if they trust the government, their health care
system, their health care provider, or other members of society in general. One factor that seems
to have a decisive effect in people’s decisions to vaccinate or not is their relationship with their
primary health care provider. As aptly described in a journalistic piece on trust and vaccination:
[T[he one point in the system that everyone seems to agree has the most potential for building
trust is the doctor-patient relationship. “Most of our interviewees trust their personal doctors a
lot,” said Amelia Jamison, a faculty research assistant the University of Maryland Center of
Health Equity who studied trust related to the flu vaccine. “People are more likely to accept
vaccines when their health care providers strongly recommend them,” Jamison said. It also helps,
she added, when doctors act as role models, and explain to patients why they choose to vaccinate
themselves and their own families.15
Thus, vaccination hesitancy and resistance to scientific arguments supporting vaccination
seem to emerge as a fine example of the three-tiered model of argumentative engagement
sketched above. Once trust in certain kinds of sources—traditional scientific sources in this
case—is severely undermined, the content of the arguments themselves becomes irrelevant from
the perspective of the mistrustful receiver, and there is no further engagement. By contrast,
13
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where trust is in place or can be built again, in particular in the doctor-patient relationship,
vaccination hesitancy can be overcome.
The second example is the familiar tactic often adopted by authoritarian politicians to discredit
sources of information that they cannot control, such as traditional journalism and media, or
scientists and other experts (Stanley 2018). Trump’s infamous appropriation of the term “fake
news” to undermine trust in mainstream media is a recent example of this phenomenon, which
has a clear precursor in the term “Lügenpresse” (‘lying press’) as used by Hitler and his
supporters in the 1930s (Snyder, 2018).
Here the observation from SET that environments of high (perceived or real) uncertainty
give rise to more commitment is illuminating. When told that other sources of information
cannot be trusted, which creates a perception of uncertainty, it is not surprising that a consumer
of news who in fact “buys” into this narrative is going to focus his attention only on the news
sources that he is told are trustworthy; he will commit to these sources, in the sense understood
by social exchange theorists. This is the proverbial “Fox News viewer” who only consumes news
from certain sources, thus becoming encapsulated in a right-wing media environment (Benkler,
Faris, & Roberts 2018), among other reasons because he is made to believe that all other sources
have hidden agendas and engage in systematic lying. Even if the percentage of people who
indeed fit this profile is ultimately not as large as one might think (as has been argued),16 it is still
the case that a politician like Trump seeks to exploit the connection between commitment and
uncertainty by artificially creating a perception of uncertainty. How successful this strategy is
going to be depends on a number of factors, some of them beyond the politician’s control
(thankfully!).
Here again we note that commitment in repeated exchanges, while surely to some extent
rational in the context of (real or perceived) uncertainty, entails opportunity costs. Those who
consume media from a narrow range of sources are missing out on the opportunity to come into
contact with a broader spectrum of views, arguments and information, from which she might
have otherwise benefited—that is, if her goal is indeed the epistemic goal of acquiring more
accurate, better grounded beliefs (of course, her goal may well not be primarily epistemic in the
first place).
Notice that, when someone is selecting which media sources she will pay attention to and
engage with, what is taking place are the first two stages described in the three-tiered model of
argumentative engagement described above. How much effort will she put into expanding the
possible range of sources, i.e., her opportunity structure for epistemic exchange? (Stage 1) And
given the alternatives presented to her, on what basis will she choose the sources to engage with
among these options, in particular given limitations of time and attention? (Stage 2) Moreover,
while it is of course preferable if an agent can make autonomous choices at these stages, there is
much that those in position of power can do to interfere with these processes (Dutilh Novaes and
de Ridder forthcoming). This may happen either by reducing the range of options for epistemic
exchange by “brute force” (through censorship for example), or by distorting perceptions of
trustworthiness by, in the words of propagandist S. Bannon, “flooding the zone with shit.”17

16
17
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8. Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued that, contrary to what may be thought and is sometimes explicitly
claimed, argumentation is not likely to be a solution to the problem of transmission of messages
in the absence of sufficient trust. This is because an agent will prefer to engage in epistemic
exchange by means of argumentation with partners whom she trusts, at least above a certain
threshold. I’ve argued for this claim on the basis of a conceptualization of argumentation as
epistemic exchange that borrows extensively from social exchange theory. I have then discussed
two real-life examples that seem to illustrate basic principles from social exchange theory in
argumentative situations: the debates around vaccination and vaccination hesitancy, and the
undermining of the credibility of traditional sources of information by some authoritarian
politicians.
But if it cannot compensate for the absence of sufficient trust, does this mean that
argumentation becomes useless? After all, where there is sufficient trust, perhaps testimony
alone suffices for the transmission of content, in which case argumentation becomes superfluous.
But I think we can resist this pessimistic conclusion regarding the purported “uselessness” of
argumentation. Engaging in argumentation may bring about a number of epistemic benefits, in
particular related to understanding, which is an epistemic state related to but distinct from
knowledge. As an approximation, understanding can be described as “a grasp of a
comprehensive body of information that is grounded in fact, is duly responsive to evidence, and
enables non-trivial inference, argument, and perhaps action regarding that subject the
information pertains to” (Elgin, 2007, p. 39). The fact that both understanding and argumentation
are crucial aspects of scientific practice in particular seems to reinforce the hypothesis that one of
the main epistemic functions of argumentation pertains to enhancing understanding by means of
the exchange of epistemic resouces. The exact details of this putative connection between
understanding and argumentation remain at this point a topic for future research. For now the
suggestion is that the social epistemic import of argumentation may well pertain not to
compensating for the absence of sufficient trust, but rather to some other epistemic phenomenon,
for example understanding.
Be that as it may, the main take-home message from the present investigation is perhaps
that argumentation theorists should not only focus on the argumentative exchanges that in fact
take place and on the content of these exchanges. It is also crucial to investigate the stages prior
to actual exchanges, in particular the choices that an agent makes on whether to engage or not in
argumentation, and on whether to engage in argumentation with interlocutor A rather than
interlocutor B. For these choices, trust is an essential factor.
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